Comparing and contrasting the colonial Dutch with China since Xi Jinping came to power

Compare and contrast China’s activities in the South China Sea since November 2012 with Dutch activities in the Indies and East Indies during the 17th and 18th Century. How do their ambitions and methods of control align or diverge?

Abstract: 

Since Xi Jinping came to power in November 2012, China’s foreign policy regarding the South China Sea has become more aggressive and unpredictable. This dissertation will attempt to fill a gap in the literature by comparing and contrasting China’s activities in the South China Sea since November 2012 with Dutch activities in the Indies and East Indies during the 17th and 18th Century. Through qualitative analysis of primary and secondary sources of both their ambitions and methods of control, it will show that their ambitions align in three ways and diverge in five ways and that their methods of control align in three ways and diverge in three ways. Moreover, it will conclude that like the Dutch, China will continue its aggressive behaviour in pursuit of its economic interests and that further parallels can be drawn by comparing China with historical powers.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Since Hu Yaobang said China’s foreign policy would follow the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in 1982,[1] China’s foreign policy had been reasonably predictable. Yet when Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012, China has not been practicing what it is preaching regarding the five principles. Instead, it has become noticeably more aggressive and unpredictable with its foreign policy in the South China Sea. Therein lies a problem.

While there is extensive literature on the China’s activities in the South China Sea and analysis on the background and reasons of why the actions are happening, and a plethora of essays, journals and books on what the Dutch did in the Indies and East Indies during the 17th and 18th Century, there is a gap in the literature on extensive analysis when comparing them both. I will attempt to add to the scholarship by comparing Chinese ambitions and methods of control in the South China Sea since the election of XI Jinping in November 2012 with the ambitions and methods of control of the Dutch in the Indies and East Indies during the 17th and 18th Century.

I will discuss that scholars state China has eight ambitions and seven methods of control regarding the South China Sea since November 2012, and that scholars state the 17th and 18th Century Dutch had six ambitions and six methods of control regarding the Indies and East Indies. Followed by stating that the Chinese and the 17th and 18th Century Dutch ambitions align in three ways: economic interests, territorial expansion and maritime dominance, and diverge in five ways: historical context, motivations and objectives, territorial claims, international legal framework and regional dynamics. In addition, I will state that their methods of control align in three ways: military action, increasing the size of the military and diplomatic measures, and diverge in three ways: artificial island building, ‘historical’ claims on sovereignty and bellicose rhetoric and domestic policies.

The question may emerge, why is important to identify these similarities and differences? What can comparisons with the 17th and 18th Dutch inform us on its ambitions? At the time of writing, China has the second largest economy,[2] second highest population[3] and the second largest military expenditure in the world.[4] It is Communist single party state with little political freedom. It rejects the Liberal International Order and wants to dismantle the unipolar system. Some question whether China will rule by force across the world and reject Article 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter. By analysing and comparing the ambitions and methods of control of China in the South China Sea with the ambitions and methods of control of the Dutch in the Indies and East Indies during the 17th and 18th Century, I will offer a thought stating concern that China will continue its pursuit of aggressive policies in the South China Sea, but it not all doom and gloom. Like the 17th and 18th Century Dutch with its aggressive policies dismantling the bipolar world of the Spanish and the Portuguese in order to secure a monopoly on spices, the Chinese are rejecting the Liberal International Order and attempting to dismantle the unipolar, in order to secure its economic interests. Which is why it would not outrightly breach Article 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter through its territorial ambition, for it would severely harm its economic interests.

In this dissertation I will define the ‘Chinese Dream’ and the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, I will discuss the methodology of the dissertation. This will be followed by Chapter 4 with an analysis of what the current literature says about what the Chinese ambitions and methods of control in the South China Sea have been since Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012. Subsequently in Chapter 5, there will be an analysis on what the current literature says about the 17th and 18th Century Dutch ambitions and methods of control in the Indies and East Indies. Chapter 6 will comparatively analyse where the Chinese and Dutch ambitions align and diverge, followed by Chapter 7 comparatively analysing their methods of control. Finally, in Chapter 8 I will conclude that from addressing the gap in the literature, there are parallels to been drawn from colonial Dutch and China.

Chapter 2: Methodology

I have used qualitative analysis for this dissertation, using an array of sources from books, online journals, web articles and government publications. Regarding the ambitions and methods of control of China, I have been limited to sources that are written in English. To offset a western perspective, I have referenced sources from Al Jazeera, China Daily, a publication owned by the Chinese Communist Party and the South China Morning Post, a publication owned by the Alibaba Group based in mainland China. In addition, I have referenced Kishore Mahbubani, a Singaporean who critics have claimed has a predisposition against the West[5] and other non-western publications.

To offset a British and American perspective regarding the ambitions and methods of control of the Dutch, I have referenced six Dutch authors, Leonard Blussé, Justus M. Van der Kroef, Oscar Gelderblom, Abe de Jong, Joost Jonker and Robert Parthesius.

Chapter 3: Definitions

Chinese Dream

There are multiple definitions on what the Chinese Dream is. Ranging from what Xi Jinping desires to the prophecy of being the ‘Middle Kingdom’. According to Osawa Jun, it is to supersede the United States economically and militarily by 2049.[6] Graham Allison states it is to dominate all across the world being the ‘Middle Kingdom’, filling the gap in the middle of heaven and earth where all bear tribute to China.[7] While Robert Lawrence Kuhn says it is to socially harmonise the population together, to uphold morals and bring about equality, to improve the country’s environment and to improve its economy and political standing in the world by 2049.[8] This date forms part of the two centenary goals, where from the 1840s to 1949, China was experiencing a century of humiliation through unequal treaties until the Chinese Communist Party won the civil war and from 1949 to 2049, China would have reached its dream.[9]

The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence

According to the Peoples Republic of China’s government, ‘The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ are “mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non- interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence”.[10]

Chapter 4: Literature Review: Chinese ambitions and methods of control in the South China Sea

In this Literature Review chapter, I will summarise what the scholarship says about Chinese activities in the South China Sea regarding ambitions and methods of control since Xi Jinping came to power. This chapter will state that there are eight ambitions and seven methods of control. The ambitions are: more control within the ‘nine-dash line’, equal relations with USA, to protect its political system and territory, to supersede the United States militarily and economically, to calm the United States with the rise of China, to not have full control in the South China Sea but the retreat of the United States from the area, the return of Taiwan and to form a defensive build up. The methods of control are: military action, artificial island building, ‘historical’ claims on sovereignty, bellicose rhetoric and domestic policies, increasing the size of the military, confrontation and diplomatic measures. The following chapter will summarise the scholarship about 17th and 18th century Dutch ambitions and methods of control in the Indies and East Indies. As there is gap in the literature comparing both Chinese and Dutch ambitions and methods of control, I will offer my comparison analysis of them both in Chapter 6 and 7.

A key author’s comments about China and the South China Sea, Bill Hayton states that despite some actors within China wanting to settle issues within South China Sea via the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),[11] China’s ambition is to take control over all that lies within the ‘nine-dash line’, due to the pursuits of strong fishing, energy and military factions.[12] His foundation on this claim can be established from the beginning of President Xi Jinping premiership where he set out a goal of constructing “an impregnable wall for border and ocean defense”.[13] This can be seen as an echo of what Admiral Liu Huaqing, the pioneer who revolutionised the Chinese Navy, said in 2004; regain Chinese land and maritime territory and resources.[14]

With the ambition of control within the ‘nine-dash line’, Hayton’s comments about China’s methods of control can be summarised in four themes. The first is direct actions where China have either been harassing other nation states territory through aggressive military manoeuvres to controversial operations, which has denied other states legitimate access to fish and energy resources. The second is through the construction and development of artificial islands in disputed territory. The third is through ‘historical’ claims about sovereignty despite them being dubious and self-contradictory. The fourth is through bellicose rhetoric and domestic policies.

A few key examples showing the first method of control, direct action, can be seen with Chinese against Vietnam, Japan, Malaysia and the Philippines. The Parcel Islands, a group of islands that sit roughly 220 miles from the most southern part of China, Hainan Island, and roughly 250 miles of the Vietnamese coast, are both claimed by Vietnam, China and Taiwan.[15] In November 2012, not long after Xi Jinping came to power, Chinese vessels severed cables belonging to a Vietnamese ship exploring for oil near the Paracel Islands.[16] The incident however occurred in the waters just off Vietnam’s Con Co Island,[17] which is within Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone. A similar incident known as the ‘Hai Yang Shi You 981 standoff’ happened in 2014 where the Chinese moved a state-owned oil rig under the CNOOC (China National Offshore Oil Corporation) into waters around the Paracel Islands which sits in Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone.[18] This resulted in an incursion between the two countries that lead to the sinking of Vietnamese boat due to being rammed by Chinese boats.[19] Thus, a concluding thought can be made that through direct action, China is trying to assert its control over Malaysian territory within the South China Sea that sits within the ‘nine-dash line’. 

In addition, another example showing Chinese direct action as a method of control was in February 2013 near the Senkaku Islands, if you are Japanese, or Diaoyu Islands if you are Chinese.[20] Following the Japanese government’s purchase of the islands from a private Japanese investor, Chinese warships target locked onto Japanese ships.[21] Regarding Malaysia, the Chinese try and assert the ambition of controlling all within the ‘nine-dash line’ through the method of sending vessels to patrol areas south of the Spratly Islands, an area rich in oil, gas and fish stocks,[22] and harass Malaysian oil survey and fishing boats which falls under the Malaysia’s Economic Exclusive Zone.[23] [24] As part of this method, China bans all fishing within the Spratly Islands during the Summer months, except for those who have a special licence. Only Chinese vessels are able to obtain this licence.[25] In an effort to offer sound reason behind this action, the Chinese claim this is merely an action regarding sustainability and the maintenance of stock levels. Ironically, grants are offered to Chinese nationals who fish in the Spratly Islands to enlarge their fishing boats capacity.[26]

Later that year, in a similar attempt to assert authority over maritime space which China claims fall under the ‘nine-dash line’ they conducted naval exercises with amphibious landing vessels by James Shoal,[27] a Malaysian reef that is 45 nautical miles of its coast, or to put it another way, around a 1000 miles from the coast of China.[28] Moreover, in 2019 another episode of Chinese harassment occurred in the Pagaga gas field, an area which lies within the Luconia Shoals, 62 miles from the Malaysian coast,[29] where the CCG (China Coast Guard) conducted dangerous manoeuvres around drilling machinery, preventing equipment boats to reach the barges.[30] Yet again, from the text above, it can be acknowledged that direct action is a method of control that China uses.

Finally, regarding the Philippines, in 2016, after the International Arbitral Tribunal declared that the sovereignty of Sea Horse Shoal fell under the jurisdiction of the Philippines, President Xi Jinping threatened then President Rodrigo Duterte that if he started drilling for gas there, China would invade.[31] [32] A potential deadly repeat of the Scarborough Shoal incident in 2012, where Chinese naval vessels prevented Filipino access to the atoll, effectively annexing it from the Philippines,[33] which also resulted in the ban of importing Filipino bananas,[34] 90% of their banana exports went to China.[35]

The second method of control Bill Hayton states that about how China achieves its ambition, is the construction and development of artificial islands. In the Fiery Cross Reef, an atoll with militarised surveillance equipment[36] which is 620 miles from the coast of Hainan Island,[37] the south-eastern tip of China, they further developed it with the erection of telephone towers in January 2013.[38]

A third method of control Bill Hayton states is China’s ‘historical’ claims about sovereignty. This can be clearly seen through China’s ambiguous rejection of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Despite its ratification by the Chinese government in 1996 and thus resigning its ‘nine-dash line’ maritime claims,[39] they have stated that ‘historical’ events in time where Chinese sailors navigated the waters within the ‘nine-dash line’ gives them the right in international law to claim the territory theirs and thereby supersede UNCLOS.[40] This can specifically be seen through Gao Zhiguo of the China Institute of Marine Affairs and Jia Bing-Bing of Tsinghua University 2013 journal.[41] Therefore, with this specific interpretation, China believes it can then legitimately deny access to any vessels it chooses to the South China Sea, including the American Navy.[42]

The fourth and final method Bill Hayton states is through bellicose rhetoric and domestic policies. The National People’s Congress has enacted that all maps and Chinese passports must include all territories within the ‘nine-dash line’.[43] In Chinese schools, pupils are taught that the most southern part of China is around 60 miles off the coast of Borneo Island.[44] The Politburo reiterate to Chinese nationals that they must be nationalistic and one of the ways to do so is to constantly pursue the reunification of Chinese territory,[45] this includes the island of Taiwan, and all atolls and islets of the South China Sea.[46] Moreover, it is often heard in Xi Jinping’s speeches that “national rejuvenation can only be complete when all the territory claimed by China is under Beijing’s control”.[47] By doing this, the Chinese government is backing itself into a corner without any way out which would be acceptable to their people and thus must continue its policies of the other methods of control which are mentioned in the previous paragraphs.

It is worth noting that critics argue that Hayton perpetuates the dated notion that Asian states are secretive, especially Vietnam and China, hence his expulsion from Vietnam in 2007.[48] Although I do agree with Hayton that China’s aims to control all within the ‘nine-dash line’, which is evidently seen with its military manoeuvres, artificial building and ‘historical’ claims on sovereignty. However, I disagree that China’s bellicose rhetoric and domestic policies have much influence on in assisting China gain further control in the South China Sea.

Another leading author on China’s ambitions and method of control is Kerry Brown. Counter to Bill Hayton’s claim about China’s maximalist desire regarding the ‘nine-dash line’, Brown states that China desires better and most importantly, equal relations with the United States. In this regard, that is having control over the South China Sea and having a larger role on the global stage[49] and thus being the regional hegemon in the Indo-Pacific region.[50] It is this idea of being recognised and admired on the global stage that Brown states what drives China.[51] An underpinning reason why China desires to be of equal status with the United States is because of American overbearingness,[52] especially with the naval assets and military bases near the South China Sea. As they are the biggest trading country in the world and its second largest importer,[53] they fear the United States could potentially shut the Malacca Straits,[54] China’s main sea route to the rest of the world. Thus, because of the presence of American naval assets and military bases near the South China Sea, China in return illustrates its military capabilities to launch attack at sea.[55] Yet contrary to Bill Hayton, this is not a method of control with the South China Sea, but merely a show of saving face with domestic audiences.[56] Instead, Brown states that China’s use of the cybersphere as a method of control.[57]

Moreover, in connection with protecting its trade routes, Brown states that China aims to protect and secure its political system and territory,[58] which thus explains Xi Jinping’s ambition to protect globalisation as said in his Davos 2017 speech,[59] for to protect and secure China’s territory and political system, it requires the constant flow of global trade. In addition, with the protection of territory, which includes its current holdings in the South China Sea, a method of sustaining that control Brown offers, is through political speeches.[60] In Xi Jinping’s speech to the legislature, the phrase of unity was consistently used.[61]

To note, Kerry Brown is Professor of Chinese Studies, who worked for the British Government in a diplomatic profession in China.[62] I agree with him that China desires equal relations with the United States, however, I believe they want to supersede the United States, resulting in an equal relationship, as seen by their actions in the South China Sea and the increase in their military spending.

Lyle Goldstein, a professor with extensive experience in the US Naval College, who has written several books on China, states that China’s ambitions in the South China Sea can be summarised into three parts. The first is to challenge the United States and supersede them in military power and influence over the South China Sea. This ambition is founded upon a shared sentiment amongst the leading figures within China’s Communist Party that its biggest security threat is the United States of America,[63] and that if China encounters conflict due to its rise, it wouldn’t be a contradiction of China’s five principles of peaceful coexistence.[64] Goldstein further states that this ambition can be seen by the fact that Chinese authorities comparing American surveillance of the Chinese coastline with the same gravity as the sale of American weapons to Taiwan.[65] Hence, the call from Yan Xuetong, a leading Chinese political scientist, that China ought to shifts its focus from financial growth to national defence,[66] a call which can be seen initially answered through the provocative attitude and extensive scale of artificial island building.[67]

The second part is to ensure control over all entities within the ‘nine-dash line’ and the reunification with Taiwan. Goldstein states that it is this ambition that legitimatises the current regime in the eyes of the Chinese people.[68] Moreover, this ambition is solidified as there is unexploited resources within the ‘nine-dash line’.[69] Which is why China disregards the rules based system in the South China Sea,[70] as seen by its refusal to visibly define the extent of where ‘their’ maritime territory is,[71] but also state that the ‘nine dash line’ as historical precedence as it originates from the administration pre communism.[72]

Whilst the third part, is to calm the United States with the rise of China so that it doesn’t act robustly against its favour. This ambition can be seen through the words of Wu Shicun of the Chinese National South China Sea Institute who tried to alleviate international worries that the notion China was creating of an ADIZ (Air Defence Identification Zone) across the entire area within the ‘nine-dash line’ was untrue.[73] Goldstein also states that Aaron Friedberg shares this sentiment that China is keen to ease America’s concerns with China’s rise.[74] Yet Goldstein isn’t truly convinced by this as he states Friedberg is wrong that China won’t become the biggest economy in the 2050s rather Goldstein stated that it would be by 2020,[75] a fact which is obviously wrong from hindsight.

Regarding methods of control, Goldstein accounts can be split into three parts. The first through China increases the size of its military. In 2014, China increased the size of its antiship cruise missiles,[76] and the number of Type 071 and Type 081 amphibious assault ships.[77] Ships that can be used for a potential invasion of Taiwan. The second part is through confrontation. From military encounter with the United States, to drilling and island building in the South China Sea. The military encounters can be seen in December 2013, where the US warships had to take evasive action to prevent crashing into Chinese vessels conducting dangerous manoeuvres and in August 2014 where Chinese aircraft did barrel rolls next US warships.[78] The drilling confrontation as a method of control can be seen in May 2014 Paracels Crisis where China drilled for oil just off the coast of Vietnam.[79] The confrontation through artificial island building can be seen with the construction of a runway on Fiery Cross Reef.[80] The final method control Goldstein discusses are military exercises in the South China Sea, which can be seen in 2014 with the unveiling of new Z-10 helicopters for the Chinese Navy, a helicopter formerly only used by infantry.[81]

To consider, reviews on Lyle Goldstein’s work have stated that he is impartial with analysis and doesn’t fall into the American lens.[82] I agree with the first two of his assertions on China’s ambitions, to supersede the United States economically and militarily and to control all within the ‘nine-dash line’. Yet, I don’t agree with the sentiment that China is trying to calm the United States with its own rise. Despite recent attempts to relax tensions,[83] China sees the United States as a mortal adversary and has no qualms with America’s agitation.[84] With his methods of control, I agree that by increasing the size of the military, causing confrontation and conducting military exercises in the South China Sea is assisting in China’s aim to supersede the United States and extend control within the ‘nine-dash line’.

Furthermore, Graham Allison, an American national security analyst and founding dean of the Kennedy School of Government summarises China’s ambitions in the South China Sea in two parts. The first, complete control of the all that is within the ‘nine-dash line’ of the South China Sea.[85] This entails ownership of all west of the first island chain.[86] In addition this means exclusive access of the waters within the ‘nine-dash line’ to Chinese military vessels, thus preventing the American Navy from conducting freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea.[87] The second part is the ambition to build a military larger than the United States of America.[88] A key segment of this, is naval supremacy in the South China Sea as historically, during the century of humiliation, the nations that subdued China were navally superior.[89] Hence President Xi Jinping’s resolve to upheave the bureaucracy in the Chinese military,[90] for if China has a more advanced military, it would mean the United States would lose its unchallenged domination of the South China Sea.[91] This part of the ambition is otherwise known as the ‘Strong Army Dream’.[92]

Allison’s synopsis of China’s methods of control in the South China Sea can be summarised as similarly raised by previously mentioned authors, through the projection of power via the construction and expansion of artificial islands. Within three years of Xi Jinping’s premiership, China has dredged and recovered almost 1180 hectares of land, providing the space to develop runways, ports and military forts across the South China Sea far from mainland China,[93] thus giving China the capability to assert power across the South China Sea and push out competing powers from the area.[94]  Allison highlights that through China’s ever-increasing military and development of fortified positions on artificial islands, it is preventing the United States from sailing within the ‘nine-dash line’ without the threat of potentially coming under Chinese fire.[95]

It is worth bearing in mind that Graham Allison’s critics state that his works are accused of omitted-variable bias and selection bias.[96] Although, I do agree with both his opinions about China’s ambitions, further control within the ‘nine-dash line’ and to supersede the United States militarily; and the methods of control of artificial island building and increasing the size of its military.

In contrast to the previous authors, Kishore Mahbubani states that China does not desire to control all of the South China Sea, rather it just wants the United States away from its waters. The United States Navy consistently operate up to twelve miles from the Chinese mainland.[97] China does not reciprocate by sailing up to twelve miles off the east or west coast of America.[98] Mahbubani reiterates that as China geopolitical clout grows, it does not want to be a bellicose state.[99] In the spirit of that desire, Xi Jinping in 2015 proposed full support the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, a declaration which reaffirmed freedom of navigation, self-restraint in conduct and the pursuit of a peaceful settlement with disputes. Further, he promised not to militarise the Spratly Islands and to sign a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea, which would legally bind the said promise.[100]

It is mindful to note that Kishore Mahbubani’s statements that the United States does not understand China due to its failure to understand China’s history and how it affects the country, is critiqued as over simplifying.[101] It is claimed that he has a predisposition against the West, where he criticises the West’s dichotomy thinking of them against everyone else, which is ironic given his Manichean methods of analysis[102]. Regarding his arguments about China’s ambitions and methods of control, I agree that China does want the United States not near its coastline, yet I don’t agree with the outlook that China does not want to control the South China Sea. The military activity in the South China Sea tells a very different story and is evidence that it has not kept its promise to not militarise the Spratly Islands, or upkeep the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.

George Magnus, an associate at the China Centre at Oxford University succinct China’s ambitions in the South China Sea in three segments. Firstly, that China desires to control the South China Sea through becoming a maritime power. The area within the ‘nine-dash line’ produces approximately 12% of the planet’s caught fish.[103] Naturally, China wants to ensure control and protection over that natural resource, hence the vast scale of its domestic construction of naval assets.[104] However, its ambition doesn’t stop there, where it is aiming to up to 200,000 fishing vessels, the biggest coastguard force and port facilities.[105] As part of wanting control of the South China Sea, it goes that United States stops interfering within the area of the chain of the first island, which according to Beijing starts in the north by Kamchatka, a Russian peninsula just north of Japan, all the way down to the Malay peninsula encompassing Taiwan and the Philippines.[106] According to Magnus, it would be China’s greatest pleasure if they could muscle the United States out of the first chain of islands.[107] In connection of the first segment, the second segment is to supplant the United States not just out of the area of the ‘nine-dash line’ but the entire Indo-Pacific region, giving it the opportunity to start the reordering of the unipolar to a multipolar.[108] And finally the third segment, is the return of Taiwan back to Beijing. Xi Jinping has consistently vowed, as seen during in 2018 during the National People’s Congress, that before his tenure as leader of China comes to an end, Taiwan will be restored back into the control of mainland China.[109]

Moreover, like his comments about ambitions, Magnus’ remarks on China’s methods of control within the South China Sea can be summarised into three parts. First, the development of reefs and atolls in the South China Sea into military bases with anti-aircraft capabilities.[110] Second, ‘historical’ claims about sovereignty, as seen with its rejection of The Hague’s ruling that it had no right to claim reefs in the Spratly Islands and that it had impeded on Philippine territory.[111] Third, punitive diplomatic measures. As Magnus states, in 2016 in retaliation to Mongolia for allowing the Dalai Lama to visit, it increased the duty on all Mongolian imports.[112] Similarly the following year, it imposed restrictions on Chinese people from visiting South Korea due to the letting the United States to install a missile defence system.[113]

It is worth noting that George Magnus is a former chief economist of UBS and that he received positive views for his not falling into the western trap of being anti-China, although his lack of focus on China’s human rights record was critiqued.[114] In response to his thoughts of China’s ambitions and methods of control, I agree with all three of the stated ambitions. Evidence points towards China trying to control all that falls in the ‘nine-dash line’, to push America out of the Indo-Pacific and to reunify Taiwan to Beijing. In addition, I agree that through artificial island construction will help towards those ambitions, I disagree that ‘historical’ claims on sovereignty and punitive diplomatic measures carry much weight in swaying the United States out of the Indo-Pacific or bringing Taiwan closer to reunification. Rather, I believe it proves to be counterproductive.

In addition, similarly to Kishore Mahbubani, Salvatore Babones queries the notion that China ambitions in the South China Sea are aggressive, rather that the Chinese military build-up is defensive.[115] Chinese’s aircraft carriers twice a year sail up and down the Chinese east coast, passing through the Taiwanese Straits, and the disputed ‘Senkaku Islands’ if you are Japanese or the ‘Diaoyu Islands’ if you are Chinese. From what may be seen by the West as a provocative action by the Chinese Navy, Babones states it is far from. If anything, it is an uncontroversial route to and from Hong Kong and Qingdao. Babones disputes where else could the Chinese sail that is not controversial if sailing up their own coastline from a major city to a major port is seen a sabre rattling.[116]

To note, Salvatore Babones is an Australian sociologist who has been accused by an Indian media outlet of being impartial towards India due to his criticisms of Indian scholars’ research abilities.[117] I disagree with his notion that China’s military build-up is defensive and not aggressive. He cites that by sailing its naval vessels up and down the Chinese coast is not an aggressive manoeuvre. I concur, however Babones fails to acknowledge other Chinese naval activity in the South China Sea which is unmistakably aggressive.

Chapter 5: Literature Review: 17th and 18th Century Dutch ambitions and methods of control in the Indies and East Indies

In this chapter I will discuss what the literature believes were the ambitions and methods of control of the 17th and 18th Century Dutch were in the Indies and East Indies. This chapter will state that there are four ambitions and six methods of control. The ambitions are: establishing a trade monopoly, exporting the war in Europe to Asia, forming a territorial colony and preventing foreign money from entering the East Indies. The methods of control are: military action, forging alliances, expanding operations, increasing the size of the military, creating an administrative centre and legal arguments.

Similar to the previous chapter, the first author I will be discussing on 17th and 18th century Dutch ambitions and methods of control in the Indies and East Indies is Bill Hayton, for he is one of the only few to have directly compared both the Chinese and the colonial Dutch ambitions and methods of control. He states that the Dutch’s ambitions can be summarised in two parts. Firstly, to trade independently from Spain, the nation that had ruled them for over 130 years and restore their own supply of Asian spices.[118] Secondly, to export the war with the Portuguese in Europe to the Asian theatre as the Portuguese were blocking the export of spice to the Dutch in return for rebelling against their then Catholic ally Spain.[119]

While Hayton’s synopsis on the Dutch’s methods of control can be seen in three parts. The forging of alliances, superior firepower and ‘legal arguments’. In its attempts to control the Spice Islands and form a monopoly on the trade of spice, the Dutch formed an alliance with the Sultan of Johor, ruler of the southern tip of the Malayan peninsula (modern day Singapore). As the Sultanate was at war with the Portuguese, naturally, the Dutch saw an enemy of their enemy as their friend and joined forces with them in attacking the Santa Catarina, a Portuguese cargo ship in 1603.[120] This alliance proved to be vital as the VOC had to relied on the support of the Johorese as they captured the settlement of Malacca in 1631.[121] The second method of control Bill Hayton raises is the superior firepower that the Dutch had over other nations in the area. Through sheer force and the imposition of brutal treaties, resulting in the deaths of many traders on Ambonya in 1623, they would reduce the Portuguese’s control and market share of the silver and spice trade across the East Indies and South China Sea.[122] Thirdly, the final method of control Hayton raises, is ‘legal arguments’. Hugo Grotius, a Dutch lobbyist at that time misconstrued legal arguments by stating that non-Christians did form part of humanity.[123] Thus, accordingly, this rendered the Portuguese argument that only Christians had the right to determine who can trade and also thereby rendered that the Portuguese had exclusive access to the seas surrounding the Indies and East Indies as they were the ‘first’ to discover them.[124] As much this sounds tenuous as a method of control, this method gave legitimacy to the Dutch to conduct the second method raised, should other powers prevent them access to the seas and the ability to trade with native kingdoms. Hypocritically, the VOC would later argue that trade agreements with native kingdoms gave them exclusive trade rights, which allowed for the use of violence to protect the integrity of the agreements.[125]

The other author who only very briefly offers a comparison between the Dutch in the 16 and 17th Century and the Chinese since Xi Jinping’s accession is Graham Allison. As mentioned previously by other authors, he states the Dutch’s ambition was to become the dominant colonial power in the region control the trading industry.[126] And for that desire to become reality they had to build a navy larger enough to secure and control the region.[127]

Moreover, Leonard Blussé, a leading Dutch author, asserts that the Dutch had two methods of control in the East Indies. First was the forging of alliances which created an embedded collection network of spices across the region.[128] The second was the use of violence. This was evidently seen with the clampdown of the 1740 revolt in Batavia, otherwise known as chizenmoord (Chinese Massacre), where several thousand ethnic Chinese people were killed for protesting at the lack of work following redundancies in sugar mills.[129]

Furthermore, according to Justus M. Van der Kroef, Jakarta born Dutch political scientist, the VOC had two interconnecting ambitions regarding the Indies and East Indies which can be summarised through the quote “one can’t trade without war, or wage war without trade”.[130] The underpinning desire was to have a monopoly on trade agreements with the indigenous kingdoms. To ensure that, they also aimed to control East Indian territory.[131] Kroef states that the Dutch were able to do this by again two interconnecting methods of control, through military force and diplomacy. Through the former, they would force out challengers directly, or through the threat of military violence they would enforce an unequal treaty, otherwise known in Dutch as ‘doortractaet ofte gewwelt’.[132]

In addition, Oscar Gelderblom, Abe de Jong and Joost Jonker, authors on a book about the VOC’s history agree with Bill Hayton, Van der Kroef and Allison that the Dutch’s central ambition was to control spice exports to Europe, thus giving them the power to set supply and price levels.[133] The authors say that this was achieved through three methods of control. They first expanded the size of their operations where in 1616, they doubled silver shipments increasing economies of scale and thereby profits.[134] Within two years, the VOC had increased their annual sales of 3 million guilders to 7.2 million guilders.[135] This allowed for the second method of control, increasing the number of soldiers, warships and developing fortifications across the East Indian archipelago.[136] Thus in turn allowed for the third method of control, forming an administrative centre,[137] through the capture of Moluccas in 1620,[138] which put the Dutch on a level footing to compete with the competing European powers.[139]

Moreover, the Dutch maritime historian Robert Parthesius shares two of Bill Hayton’s sentiments on Dutch ambition, forming a trade monopoly in the East Indies and exporting the war in Europe against the Spanish to the East Indian theatre. In his book ‘Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters’, he also states two more ambitions: conquering and creating a formal territorial colony in the East Indies, and stopping the flow of foreign money which was not Dutch into the region. In agreement with Hayton, Parthesius states that the definitive aim of the Dutch in the East Indies during the 17th and 18th centuries was to dominate the spice market.[140] Parthesius reiterates that it was initially a simple economical desire,[141] where the first three Governor-Generals of the VOC from 1610-1619 (Pieter Both, Gerard Reynst and Laurens Reael) were tasked to secure a spice monopoly.[142] This entailed thwarting rival European traders[143] through stopping foreign boats from sailing around Spice Islands[144] which would stem the flow of foreign money into the East Indies to prevent other European sellers from buying spices.[145] In addition, changing economic policies, such as the expansion into different markets such pewter,[146] not just mace and nutmeg from the Banda Islands.[147] Consequentially, this would provide the Dutch the chance to set the buying price of the spices from the natives and the selling price to European market.[148] Furthermore, this ambition was not limited to the control of the export market to Europe but to also challenge the import market into China.[149] Additionally, a connecting these ambitions, the VOC thought to reach these goals, it was a prerequisite to obtain control over economic hub, hence Ambon and Moluccas was chosen to be acquired,[150] as the Dutch government also wanted to export the hostilities with the Spanish and Portuguese in Europe to the East Indies.[151]

Parthesius’ states that the Dutch’s methods of control can be split into three sections. The first, as partially raised earlier as an ambition, was the expansion of their initial ambitions to reach higher profits. This entailed three policy changes, investing profits to increase capacity and thus have better economies of scale which reduced shipping costs;[152] engaging itself into native politics to deal with local disputes[153] and thereby integrating itself into whole East Indian market, not just spices.[154]

The second method of control the Dutch used was the military action. In order to succeed in its desire to create a spice monopoly in the East Indies, the VOC had to occupy and conquer the island of Ambon in 1605 and substitute the indigenous populace with European settlers as they couldn’t control the former from illicit clove trading.[155] A similar situation would occur in 1621, where two-thousand from the VOC invaded the Banda Islands massacring the local population and sending Dutch farmers to fill in their absence to cultivate the nutmeg and mace production.[156] To protect its spice market they had to enforce their sovereignty across the trade routes and potentially attack competitors from Europe.[157] Examples of this happened in 1617 and 1618 where the VOC seized English vessels for straying into the maritime territory near Ambon.[158] With the increasing threat European competitors, the Dutch in 1620s started a recruitment and construction programme amassing large warships with the particular focus on the Iberian nations.[159] Parthesius later states that through the Dutch then having a significant military force the Dutch believed they could further challenge the Portuguese beyond the East Indies and go further afield capturing vessels and patrol and blockade the Portuguese around Galle.[160]

The third method of control Parthesius raises is the conduct of diplomacy and forging of alliances. In their fight against the Portuguese, the Dutch would align themselves with local kingdoms who had ceded territory to Portugal. This can be seen in 1606 with Sultan of Johor who lost Malacca to the Portuguese,[161] and in 1638 with the King of Kandy who lost parts of Ceylon to the Portuguese.[162] Moreover, following the capture of English ships in 1617 and 1618, the Dutch knew they weren’t able to win a war against the English whilst still fighting the Spanish and the Portuguese. Thus, they formed an alliance with the English where they would share exclusivity to the spice trade and divide expenses and proceeds in the protecting and sale of spices.[163]

The last author I will analyse is Nathan John Franklin, a specialist in Indonesian history. He states that the VOC had three ambitions in the East Indies: the capitulation of native rulers, the establishment of a monopoly over the spice trade and to convert the local population to Christianity.[164] He comments that the third ambition was later dropped as the Dutch had foreseen the potential chaos that could be created through conversions as seen in Europe with the reformation movement.[165] To reach the obtain the other two ambitions, Franklin notes that there were two methods to achieve them. The Dutch forged alliances with local Imams offering little intervention in local and religious matters and secondly, military intervention.[166] Initially, according to Franklin, to ensure practical control over the indigenous population when they had disembarked, the Dutch pacified local religious leaders and officers of authority.[167] But after the preliminary years of establishing control, from 1619 onwards, the Dutch refrained from interfering and policing Islam on the islands as it proved a popular lever in negotiations with the populace.[168] In return, Muslims on the islands would comply with Dutch demands regarding the purchase, sale and production of spices.[169]

Chapter 6: Comparative Analysis of Ambitions

There are many similarities and differences to be found comparing the Chinese ambitions in the South China Sea since November 2012 and the 17th and 18th Century Dutch in the Indies and East Indies. This section will show how their ambitions align through three parts: economic interests, territorial expansion and maritime dominance. And this section will show how their ambitions diverge in five parts: historical context, motivations and objectives, territorial claims, international legal framework and regional dynamics.

The first similarity to be discussed is economic interests. The colonial Dutch, a seafaring nation who had been occupied by Spain for over 150 years, wanted to challenge them and their Roman Catholic ally Portugal, and secure a monopoly over the valuable spice trade, a resource which had made the Spanish and Portuguese rich. They desired to increase the size of their economy and become the dominant economic powerhouse. Hence their conquest of the Banda Islands and the cultivation of mace, nutmeg and cloves, to achieve a monopoly over the spice trade in the East Indies.[170]

Like the Dutch, China wants to secure its economic interests. Today it is the world’s largest trader and second biggest importer.[171] This requires an enormous amount of energy to manufacture products and fuel to ship goods across the world. Thus, it needs a diverse supply of oil and gas to keep their economy growing. Hence why in November 2012, it harassed Vietnamese ships exploring for oil by the Con Co Island, (part of the Paracel Islands) which lies within Vietnam’s Economic Exclusive Zone.[172] For China wants natural resources to itself to supplement its oil and gas supply. When China has secured its steady supply, China will act less aggressively in the region.[173] And again, hence why the China National Offshore Oil Corporation in 2014 towed an oil rig to an area south of the Paracel Islands, an incident that became known as the Hai Yang Shi You 981 standoff.[174] Moreover, as mentioned the Chinese desired more oil and gas supplies to keep in wheels of the manufacturing and shipping industry going. This merely one aspect of increasing the size of the Chinese economy, a key component of the Chinese Dream. As previously defined in Chapter 3, the Chinese Dream has multiple definitions. This could be to overtake the United States of America as the largest economy and military by 2049.[175] Or perhaps it is a greater ambition to dominate all across the world and fulfil the belief of being the ‘Middle Kingdom’, filling the gap in the middle of heaven and earth where all bear tribute to China.[176]

The second ambition they both share is the desire to expand their territory. Following the evacuation of the Kuomintang government to the island of Taiwan, it has always been a desire of the Chinese Communist Party to reunite the island back into the control of Beijing.[177] Hence Xi Jinping’s declaration to re-establish control over the island,[178] and the conduct of wargames around Taiwan with naval and air force vehicles that could be used in a potential invasion of Taiwan.[179] Moreover, a central part that provides legitimacy to Chinese Communist Party to rule is the promise of delivering higher living standards[180] and restore China’s territorial sovereignty.[181] Hence, the construction of artificial islands and their subsequent militarisation as seen with the instalment surface to air missiles in Woody Island.[182] This is so that China can patrol and claim the waters that 12% of the world’s fish is caught,[183] and  to prevent American naval vessels from sailing in the South China Sea without being in range of Chinese missiles.[184] Similarly, the 17th Century Dutch wanted to control the market on spices and establish territorial colonies in the East Indies. Hence in 1621, the Dutch conquered the Banda Islands, the single area in the 17th Century world where nutmeg could be cultivated.[185] 

The third ambition the Chinese and the 17th Century Dutch share is the maritime dominance. China desires to be the regional hegemon in the South China Sea and beyond. In order to do so, it has increased its defence spending by 7.2% where it has increased its number of amphibious assault ships[186] and just completed the construction of its third aircraft carrier.[187] Moreover, as previously mentioned, in asserting their maritime dominance, China has constructed and developed artificial islands, as seen with the construction of a runway on Fiery Cross Reef.[188] As this reef is 740 miles out from mainland China,[189] it provides the opportunity for China to conduct patrols near the reef in an effort to claim its sovereignty of all within the ‘nine-dash line’, as seen with its clash in the Filipino Second Thomas Shoal where it fired water cannons at Filipino resupply ships.[190] Similarly the Dutch wanted to asserts its control over the waters of the Indies and East Indies protect its trade routes to ensure its spice monopoly was interrupted. Thus, they built strongly armoured and equipped vessels to patrol their cargo[191] and conducted piracy raids against Portuguese cargo ships.[192]

However, a disparity which links the previous ambitions between the Chinese and the 17th Century Dutch can be found through the difference in historical context. The China seen since the election of Xi Jinping as Chairman has been shaped by its history. The horrors it endured during the century of humiliation looms and has roots in China’s geostrategic aims. A time in history which Xi Jinping has vowed won’t happen again.[193] Hence its naval build up. Every power that had subdued China in the century of humiliation were naval powers and had used their navies to defeat China.[194] China is paranoid that history could repeat itself, thus it is determined to be the richest country in the world with the largest military in the world. For if it would reach those aims it would ensure that the times of unequal treaties and gun boat diplomacy against China were a thing of the past. Whilst with the Dutch in the 16th and 17th Century, they weren’t entirely shaped by a past of submission. Yes, the Dutch were eager to remove the shackles of suppression from Roman Catholic Spain, but this was a time of enlightenment and the age of European colonialism. Like its European counterparts, the Dutch were shaped of the promise of riches from the unexplored East Indies, and the duty to civilise indigenous people.[195] Hence its voyages across the other side of the world, where it traded, conquered and settled in the East Indies.

The second difference that can be found is through motivations and objectives. Similarly raised above, China is moulded by its history. Additionally, to preventing a repeat of the century of humiliation, China desires to fulfil the ‘Chinese Dream’. As defined in Chapter 2, there is an interpretation that this entails fulfilling its two centenary goals of superseding the American economy and military by 2049,[196] a hundred years since the Chinese Communist Party to power. Hence its aggressive military build-up. The Dutch, however, were motivated by the promise of riches of the spices and desired to monopolise the production and export. Hence its conquest of the Banda Islands.

The third difference is territorial claims. The Dutch did not make historical claims that territory in the East Indies had always belonged to them. They wanted territory in the East Indies, so they took it. Whilst the Chinese have claimed that Taiwan has always belonged to mainland China. In addition, Beijing claims that since Chinese people had been sailing up and down South China Sea since the Han Dynasty,[197] it is rightfully part of Chinese territorial waters.

The fourth difference is the international legal framework. Similar to the historical context paragraph, the times which China now and the Dutch in the 16th and 17th century are worlds apart. The Dutch were in living in a Golden Age where white Europeans were considered superior to others, thus allowing them to acquire ‘oriental’ lands with little repercussion.[198] While China today lives in a world with international laws and human rights which are protected under the United Nations Charter. Although China only adheres to them when it suits them, as seen with its challenge of the UNCLOS.

The fifth and final difference is regional dynamics. The Chinese are challenging the unipolar world, where the United States are, according to Beijing, interfering in its sphere of influence by supporting the Philippines[199] and Taiwan.[200] China also faces challenges in the South China region from the ASEAN countries and others who independently vie for territorial control within the area, as seen with in the Spratly Islands. While the Dutch were initially challenging a bipolar world of Spain and Portugal for territory and control of spices in the East Indies.

Chapter 7: Comparative Analysis of Methods of Control

Related to the previous chapter, this chapter will compare the similarities and differences in the methods of control between the Chinese in the South China Sea since November 2012 and the 17th and 18th Century Dutch in the Indies and East Indies. This section will show how their methods of control align through three parts: military action, increasing the size of the military and diplomatic measures. And this section will show how their methods of control diverge in three parts: technological differences, ‘historical claims’ on sovereignty and bellicose rhetoric.

The first similarity to be discussed is military action. In order for the Dutch to achieve their key aim of establishing a trade monopoly on spices, it required them to take over the land where they grew. This was exactly done in 1621 where the VOC conquered the Banda Islands.[201] Like the Dutch, a key aim of China is to secure its economic interests. With over 1.4 billion people in China,[202] the country needs to acquire the food to feed its people and the energy to run its manufacturing economy. Hence its aggressive manoeuvres in the Spratly Island where it has barred non-Chinese fisherman from fishing in the area[203] and sunk foreign fishing boats. [204] This an attempt to assert authority over the area to ensure control over its vast fish stocks[205] and to explore its potential oil and gas reserves.[206] In addition, in an effort to asserts its domineering position in the region, China conducted naval exercises in territory which is not theirs under the UNCLOS.[207] Moreover, to hamper the Philippines from resupplying Scarborough Shoal, the Chinese fired water cannons at its resupply boats.[208]

The second similarity is increasing the size of the military. For the previous method of control to happen it required the Dutch and the Chinese to increase their size of the navies. As the Dutch were wary of the combined military might of Roman Catholic Spain and Portugal in jeopardising its chances to form a trade monopoly,[209] they embarked on a ship building programme.[210] Thus, with a bigger military, the Dutch were able to take most of the silver trade and spice ports from the Portuguese.[211] Similarly, for China to expand its influence across the ‘nine-dash line’, with the memory of its submission to the United States in the 1996 Taiwan Crisis,[212] China began modernising its military. Within two years of Xi Jinping coming into power, China had accrued “more than 60 submarines, 55 medium and large amphibious ships, and roughly 85 missile-equipped small combatants”.[213] In the subsequent four years, China had built a navy larger than all of the French naval assets combined.[214]

The third and final similarity is diplomatic measures. To help maintain the Dutch’s control of the Banda Islands, the VOC saw that rather than making an invidious decision to convert the local population to Christianity, it came to an arrangement with the local imams that they would devolve power to them to deal with religious issues, if they recognised Dutch control on the spice market.[215] In a similar sense, China through diplomatic measures, imposed punitive measures on the Philippines, banning the import of bananas from some Filipino companies, as the Manilla government continued in its effort to secure sovereignty of Scarborough Shoal in The Hague.[216] The diplomatic measure reduced banana exports from the Philippines to China by over 66%.

The first difference in methods of control between the Chinese and colonial Dutch is technological difference. Whilst the Dutch were limited to wooden ships and cannons to enforce their authority across the East Indies, China has been constructing artificial islands throughout the South China Sea to enforce its authority within the ‘nine-dash line’. By 2020, China had developed Woody Island in the Paracel Islands to a military base with long-range bombers.[217] By 2015, they had developed Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Islands, an atoll which is 180km off the Filipino coast,[218] to an air force base with a runway over 3000 metres,[219] which is roughly the same length as the runway at London Stansted Airport.[220] This allowed Chinese fighter jets to harass American planes over the South China Sea.[221] Whilst around 400 years ago the Dutch were constrained to blockades and piracy through naval boarding.[222]

The second difference can be found through ‘historical claims. Whilst the Dutch initially claimed that they had a right to conduct independent trade deals with indigenous kingdoms,[223] they never claimed that they had a historical right to territory within the region. However, China has always claimed that all within the ‘nine-dash line’, has belonged to China as it has been sailing across the South China Sea since the Han Dynasty in 200 BC.[224] Hence why it didn’t acknowledge The Hague’s ruling that China had no historical right to all that falls within the ‘nine-dash line’.[225]

The third and final difference in methods of control is bellicose rhetoric. The Dutch couldn’t use bellicose rhetoric or domestic policies as a method of control as the advent of the quick messaging platforms such as telegrams or the internet had yet to be created. Whilst the Chinese on the other hand often use bellicose rhetoric in an effort to scare the US Navy out of the Indo-Pacific, as seen when they promised to enact “necessary measures” against the United States following American warships sailing pass Scarborough Shoal.[226]

Chapter 8: Conclusion

To conclude, to summarise my findings in this dissertation, I have found out that the literature states that since November 2012, China has eight ambitions and seven methods of control regarding the South China Sea. The ambitions are: more control within the ‘nine-dash line’, equal relations with the United States, to protect its political system and territory, to supersede the United States militarily and economically, to calm the United States about the rise of China, to not have total control of the South China Sea but the retreat of the United States out of the region, the return of Taiwan and to form a defensive build-up. The methods of control are: military action, artificial island building, ‘historical’ claims on sovereignty, bellicose rhetoric and domestic policies, increasing the size of the military, confrontation and diplomatic measures. An ambition that was consistently raised in the literature was China’s desire to increase its control in the South China Sea, with the belief that everything that falls within the ‘nine-dash line’ is rightfully theirs. This ambition underpins all the other ambitions such as protecting its political system and the return of Taiwan. Thus, it explains why China is conducting aggressive methods of control, such as military action and artificial island building. For if China was to concede on its core ambition, all the others could potentially fall as well.

In addition, I have found out that the literature states that the 17th and 18th Century Dutch have four ambitions and six methods of control regarding the Indies and the East Indies. The ambitions are: establishing a trade monopoly, exporting the war in Europe to Asia, forming a territorial colony and preventing foreign money from entering the East Indies. The methods of control are: military action, forging alliances, expanding operations, increasing the size of the military, creating an administrative centre and legal arguments. An ambition that was consistently raised in the literature was the Dutch’s desire form a monopoly on the spice trade. Hence the other ambitions such forming a territorial colony and preventing the flow of foreign money into the East Indies, for they all complimented the core ambition.

Moreover, I have found that by comparing and contrasting their ambitions, they align in three ways and diverge in five ways. The similarities are: economic interests, territorial expansion and maritime dominance. The differences are: historical context, motivations and objectives, territorial claims, international legal framework and regional dynamics.

Furthermore, I have found that by comparing and contrasting their methods of control, they align in three ways and diverge in three ways. The similarities are: military action, increasing the size of the military and diplomatic measures. The differences are: technological differences, ‘historical’ claims on sovereignty and bellicose rhetoric.

The findings named above is what makes this dissertation different from other works. As stated in the introduction, there is a plethora of research on what China has been doing regarding the South China Sea since Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and thus de-facto leader of China in November 2012. Likewise, there is an abundance of books and journals on what the Dutch did Indies and East Indies during the 17th and 18th Century. However, there is a shortage of research comparing them both, with a particular focus on their ambitions and methods of control. Despite some mentions comparing the Chinese and colonial Dutch by Bill Hayton and Graham Allison, there is a gap in the literature which needs to be filled. By comparing and contrasting Chinese ambitions and methods of control in the South China Sea with the colonial Dutch ambitions and methods of control in the Indies and East Indies, I am offering an explanation of how they align and diverge in foreign policy towards a contested area and what it can inform us on what China’s intentions are. Like the colonial Dutch and their aspiration to form a trade monopoly on spices, the Chinese want to secure it economic interests by acquiring and controlling the maritime territory within the ‘nine-dash line’, thus giving them better access to fishing grounds and oil and gas reserves than they do now. Therefore, it is highly likely that China will continue to pursue aggressive methods of control, such as firing water cannons at foreign boats and therefore repeats of the Hai Yang Shi You 981 standoff and further development of artificial islands into military fortresses will continue to happen. There are further parallels to be made by comparing China with historical powers and should more research be made on this; it may offer more insight into China’s ambitions and what methods of control they will use.

Chapter 9: Primary Sources Bibliography

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Chapter 10: Secondary Sources Bibliography

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[53] Brown, “The World According to XI,” 89-90.

[54] Brown, “China’s Foreign Policy,” 330-331.

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[56] Brown, “The World According to XI,” 118-119.

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[58] Brown, “The World According to XI,” 88.

[59] Brown, “The World According to XI,” 89.

[60] Brown, “The World According to XI,” 113-119.

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[97] Kishore Mahbubani, Has China Won?: The Chinese Challenge to American Primacy (New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2020), 102.

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[99] Mahbubani, “Has China Won,” 103-104.

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[101] Vincent, “Overcoming Bias,”

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[106] Magnus, “Red Flags,” 184.

[107] Magnus, “Red Flags,” 204.

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[110] Magnus, “Red Flags,” 185.

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[120] Hayton, “The South China Sea,” 37.

[121] Hayton, “The South China Sea,” 41.

[122] Hayton, “The South China Sea,” 41.

[123] Hayton, “The South China Sea,” 38.

[124] Hayton, “The South China Sea,” 38.

[125] Hayton, “The South China Sea,” 38.

[126] Allison, “Destined for War,” 51.

[127] Allison, “Destined for War,” 255.

[128] Leonard Blussé, Visible Cities: Canton, Nagasaki, and Batavia and the Coming of the Americans (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2008), 58.

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[130] Justus M. Van der Kroef, “The Decline and Fall of the Dutch East India Company,” The Historian 10, no. 2 (Spring 1948): 118–34, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6563.1948.tb00452.x, 119.

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[132] Van der Kroef, “The Decline and Fall,”118.

[133] Oscar Gelderblom, Abe de Jong, and Joost Jonker, “The Formative Years of the Modern Corporation: The Dutch East India Company VOC, 1602–1623,” The Journal of Economic History 73, no. 4 (November 15, 2013): 1050–76, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022050713000879, 1066.

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[142] Parthesius, “Dutch Ships in,” 37.

[143] Parthesius, “Dutch Ships in,” 35.

[144] Parthesius, “Dutch Ships in,” 37.

[145] Parthesius, “Dutch Ships in,” 35.

[146] Parthesius, “Dutch Ships in,” 38,48.

[147] Parthesius, “Dutch Ships in,” 41.

[148] Parthesius, “Dutch Ships in,” 35.

[149] Parthesius, “Dutch Ships in,” 33.

[150] Parthesius, “Dutch Ships in,” 36.

[151] Parthesius, “Dutch Ships in,” 36.

[152] Parthesius, “Dutch Ships in,” 33,36.

[153] Parthesius, “Dutch Ships in,” 37.

[154] Parthesius, “Dutch Ships in,” 35.

[155] Parthesius, “Dutch Ships in,” 42.

[156] Parthesius, “Dutch Ships in,” 41.

[157] Parthesius, “Dutch Ships in,” 45.

[158] Parthesius, “Dutch Ships in,” 38.

[159] Parthesius, “Dutch Ships in,” 47.

[160] Parthesius, “Dutch Ships in,” 45,47,48.

[161] Parthesius, “Dutch Ships in,” 48.

[162] Parthesius, “Dutch Ships in,” 45.

[163] Parthesius, “Dutch Ships in,” 38.

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[166] Franklin, “Islam and the Dutch” 572,576,582.

[167] Franklin, “Islam and the Dutch” 582.

[168] Franklin, “Islam and the Dutch” 582.

[169] Franklin, “Islam and the Dutch” 82.

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